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Summary This paper examines the principle of public equality which, according 
to the view Thomas Christiano defends in his book The Constitution of Equality: 
Democratic Authority and Its Limits, is of central importance for social justice and 
democracy. Christiano also holds that the authority of democracy, and its limits, 
are grounded in this principle. Christiano’s democratic theory can be, broadly 
speaking, divided in two parts. The first part deals with the derivation and justifica-
tion of the principle of public equality. The second part argues why and how the 
authority of democracy, and its limits, are based on this principle. This article will 
deal only with the first part of Christiano’s theory. While I believe that the second 
part is crucially important for Christiano’s democratic theory, I think that before ex-
amining the role of the principle of public equality, it is necessary to examine its 
nature. For that reason, this paper deals primarily with the nature of the principle 
of public equality as the requirement of social justice and the basis for the justifica-
tion of democracy.*
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Introduction
This paper examines the principle of 
public equality which, according to 
Thomas Christiano’s view, defended in 
his book The Constitution of Equality: 
Democratic Authority and Its Limits, is of 
central importance for social justice and 
democracy. Christiano also holds that 
the authority of democracy, and its lim-
its, are grounded in this principle. Chris-
tiano’s democratic theory can be, broad-
ly speaking, divided in two parts. The 
first part deals with the derivation and 
justification of the principle of public 
equality. The second part argues why 
and how the authority of democracy, 
* This paper was presented at the symposium 
dedicated to the political philosophy of Tho-
mas Christiano within the Summer School 
Equality and Citizenship held at the Univer-
sity of Rijeka, June 30-July 5, 2014. I would 
like to thank Thomas Christiano, Elvio 
Baccarini and Andrew Williams for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of the 
paper.




























and its limits, are based on this principle. 
This article will deal only with the first 
part of Christiano’s theory. I believe that 
the second part is crucially important 
for Christiano’s democratic theory. Still, 
I think that before examining the role of 
the principle of public equality, it is nec-
essary to examine its nature. For that 
reason, this paper primarily deals with 
the nature of the principle of public 
equality as the requirement of social jus-
tice and the basis for the justification of 
democracy.
The first part of Christiano’s theory 
consists of three steps. The first step is to 
demonstrate that social justice and its 
requirement of equality are grounded in 
the dignity of persons. The second step is 
grounding democracy in the principle of 
public equality as the requirement of 
social justice. The third step shows why 
democracy is the public realization of 
equality. Accordingly, the article is struc-
tured as follows. In the first section, I 
present Christiano’s view of persons as 
authorities in the realm of value, as well 
as the argument that shows how the dig-
nity of persons grounds the requirement 
that in order to have justice, the well-be-
ing of every person must be advanced 
equally. In the second section, I show 
how Christiano derives the principle of 
public equality and how that principle 
contributes to the intrinsic fairness of 
democracy. In the third section, I ex-
plore Christiano’s main argument for the 
justification of democracy.
From the Dignity of Persons  
to Social Justice
Christiano maintains that social jus-
tice is grounded in the dignity of per-
sons. I will formalize his argument in the 
following way:
1. Human persons are authorities in 
the realm of value.
2. Being an authority in the realm of 
value is valuable.
3. (from 1 and 2) Therefore, human 
persons are valuable.
4. Everyone holding authority in the 
realm of value has a special status 
and is owed dignity.
5. (from 1 and 4) Therefore, human 
person is owed dignity.
6. Everyone having the capacity of be-
ing the authority in the realm of va-
lue has equal moral status.
7. Every human person has the capa-
city to be the authority in the realm 
of value.
8. (from 6 and 7) Therefore, every hu-
man person has equal moral status.
9. The well-being of a person is the 
happy exercise of the distinctive aut-
hority in the realm of value.
10. The requirement of justice is that re-
levantly like cases should be treated 
alike and relevantly unlike cases un-
like (the generic principle of justice).
11. There are no relevant differences 
among persons.
12. (from 8, 9, 10, and 11) Therefore, the 
requirement of justice is that the 
well-being of every person is advan-
ced equally.
What this complex argument shows 
is that the dignity of persons implies 
equality as the requirement of justice. In 
what follows I briefly examine Chris-
tiano’s explanation for each of the prem-
ises. I first focus on the premises of 1–4, 
which establish human dignity. I then 
pay special attention to the premises of 
8–11, establishing equality as one of the 
fundamental principles of justice. Given 
that I am primarily interested in public 








































ciple, in this section I do not question 
any of these premises. But, before focus-
ing on the principle of public equality, 
we should first examine how the princi-
ple was derived.
Premise 1 claims that human per-
sons are authorities in the realm of val-
ue. This premise in fact provides the an-
swer to the question what differs humans 
from other living beings. Contrary to 
other beings, humans have the capacity 
to recognize values and organize their 
lives in keeping with certain values. In 
addition, humans are capable of creating 
values. Therefore, we act as authorities in 
the realm of value whenever we admire a 
beautiful landscape, or choose to act 
morally, or when we create a work of art. 
Christiano argues that a distinctive ca-
pacity of humans is that they can appre-
ciate and create not just any, but what he 
calls the intrinsic values. Given that hu-
mans are uniquely capable of being au-
thorities in the realm of a value, it is 
natural to think of this very capacity as 
valuable, as is argued in premise 2. Or as 
Christiano puts it, “there is an intrinsic 
value in the recognition and apprecia-
tion of the intrinsic value as well as in 
the self-conscious production or crea-
tion of value” (Christiano, 2008: 15). 
From the first two premises it can be 
concluded that the human persons must 
be considered as valuable.1
1 For Kantian derivation of  the same conclu-
sion, see Korsgaard, 1996: 123. Christiano’s 
relationship to Kant’s doctrine of humanity 
is twofold. On this, he says as follows: “The 
notion of humanity I sketch here owes much 
to Immanuel Kant’s conception of humanity 
in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals… It is also quite different in that the 
value of humanity, in my view, connects hu-
man beings with the realm of value in the 
world and is not the ground of all value, as 
many Kantians would have it” (Christiano, 
2008: 14).
Premise 4 says that those who are 
authorities in the realm of value hold a 
special status and their dignity must be 
recognized. Given that premise 1 estab-
lishes that persons are beings who can be 
authorities in the realm of value, this 
further means that they have a special 
status, and dignity is due to them. Since 
every person must be deemed valuable, 
their dignity means that no person may 
be sacrificed for the benefit of others. In 
other words, no person may be used as a 
mere means to achieve another persons’ 
values. Although the equal treatment of 
persons on account of their dignity is a 
principle characteristic to utilitarianism, 
Christiano holds that his view of the dig-
nity of persons, stemming from their 
authority in the realm of value, avoids 
usual objections to utilitarianism. The 
initial treatment of all persons as equal, 
because of the utilitarian calculus of the 
greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber, might lead to arguing that it is justi-
fied to sacrifice some persons for the 
good of others. Christiano holds that 
this runs counter to the fact that human 
persons hold a special status and that 
dignity is owed to them. His view of hu-
man dignity blocks these utilitarian con-
clusions. The argument so far has 
demonstrated that premises 1–4 estab-
lish the dignity of the persons. We 
should now look at how equality as the 
requirement of social justice is derived 
from the assumption of the dignity of 
persons.
The argument so far has established 
that the human persons, as the authori-
ties in the realm of value, hold a special 
status, and that therefore dignity is due 
to them. Premise 6 is a general claim that 
anyone who has the capacity to be the 
authority in the realm of value must not 
only hold a special status, but an equal 
























that all human persons hold the same 
moral status, it is necessary to accept 
premise 7, which says that all human 
persons have the capacity to be authori-
ties in the realm of value. But this claim 
is far more controversial than all the 
above claims. Christiano clearly recog-
nizes this and proceeds to offer several 
responses to the possible objection that 
the unequal capacity to be the authority 
in the realm of value entails an inequali-
ty of moral status. For example, a person 
who is an important artist, and whose 
skills and abilities bring forth valuable 
works of art, can be considered a higher 
authority in the realm of value than 
someone not interested in art, or simply 
not engaged in it. If the capacities to be 
the authority in the realm of value differ, 
does that mean that human persons can 
be attributed an unequal moral status? 
Despite the fact that Christiano does not 
provide a decisive argument to refute 
this claim, he contends that the value of 
treating all persons as authorities in the 
realm of value by far exceeds any value 
that a person can create. Therefore, any 
treatment of people which does not as-
sume their equal moral status would not 
be justified. Given premise 7, we arrive 
from the special status of human per-
sons to their equal moral status.
Recall that the main objective of 
Christiano’s argument is to demonstrate 
how equality, as the requirement of jus-
tice, is derived from the dignity of per-
sons. Here premise 9 is crucially impor-
tant since the well-being of every person 
is something on which the conception of 
justice operates. This premise is in fact 
Christiano’s definition of well-being, 
which reads, “the well-being of a person 
is, broadly speaking, the happy exercise 
of the distinctive authority of persons” 
(Christiano, 2008: 18). Why is it essen-
tial for well-being that the persons are 
not just authorities in the realm of value, 
but that they happily exercise this au-
thority? Let us imagine a person who 
acts according to the moral values, but 
does so under coercion rather than of 
their own choice. Christiano argues that, 
despite the fact that this person can be 
said to be doing what is good, it cannot 
be claimed that their behavior is condu-
cive to their well-being. Hence, Chris-
tiano’s concept of well-being contains 
two components: it must reflect the idea 
of good as perceived by each person in-
dividually, and the exercise of this idea 
of good must be conducive to the flour-
ishing of that person (Christiano, 2008: 
19). Only if these two conditions have 
been met we say that a person is happily 
exercising her authority in the realm of 
value. But for someone to be able to hap-
pily exercise their authority in the realm 
of value it is necessary that they have this 
capacity. For this reason, the dignity of a 
person is at the core of Christiano’s view 
of well-being.
Premise 10 introduces the well-
known requirement of justice that one 
ought to treat relevantly like cases alike 
and relevantly unlike cases unlike. 
Christiano calls this requirement the 
generic principle of justice. He explores 
it against the background of another re-
quirement of justice, that everyone is 
due what is appropriate to them. Chris-
tiano calls this the principle of propriety. 
Although this principle resembles the 
conception of justice grounded on the 
principle of desert, Christiano thinks 
that the principle of propriety is far more 
abstract and general in character than 
the principle of desert. The basic idea 
behind the principle of propriety and the 
generic principle of justice is that once 
we know what it is due to human beings, 
we can also tell what justice, concerning 








































Since we already established that dignity 
is due to every person, the principle of 
propriety says that this is also the re-
quirement of justice. And the generic 
principle of justice, which includes the 
principle of propriety, establishes that 
justice requires that all persons who are 
due their dignity must be treated equal-
ly. This merely redefines the basic re-
quirements related to the dignity of a 
person in terms of justice. But the re-
quirements of justice go even further. 
Persons are due their dignity because 
they are the authorities in the realm of 
value. However, they must also happily 
exercise their authority, and this is at the 
core of well-being. If that is so, then the 
principle of propriety requires that per-
sons are due the advancement of their 
well-being. But given that this principle 
does not establish how much well-being 
every person is due, the generic princi-
ple of justice may provide the solution.
If any relevant differences between 
persons existed, then the generic princi-
ple of justice would require a differential 
treatment. For that reason, premise 11 
establishes that there is no relevant dif-
ference among persons. Yet, recalling 
the fact that differences between persons 
may stem from their differing produc-
tive talents, Christiano suggests to limit 
the argument outlined in premise 11 to 
persons in pre-adult age, when the dif-
ferences in productive talents are still 
not evident. However, such understand-
ing of premise 11 appears to be signifi-
cantly more controversial, since it relies 
on an arbitrary domain restriction. But 
even with such a restriction, it is not cer-
tain that what is said by premise 11 can 
be granted. Take for example a gifted vi-
olin player, who at the age of five achieves 
world fame and accumulates wealth. So 
relevant differences between persons on 
the grounds of their unique capacities 
can arise before their coming of age. 
Since my main objective in this section 
is not to criticize but rather to recon-
struct Christiano’s argument, I will ac-
cept the validity of premise 11 as well.
Premises 8–11 establish the conclu-
sion that justice demands the well-being 
of each person be equally advanced. 
Given that Premises 8–10 are grounded 
in the dignity of persons, and that prem-
ise 11 only further accentuates the equal 
moral status of persons, it means that 
the argument establishes how equality as 
a requirement of justice is derived from 
the dignity of persons. To see why that is 
so, we can assume that the well-being of 
those who are better off should be ad-
vanced to a greater extent than the inter-
ests of those who are worse off. This 
would imply some sort of differential 
treatment because of the relevant differ-
ences. But such a differential treatment 
is excluded by premise 11. If there are no 
relevant differences among persons, 
then their equal moral status as argued 
in premise 8 is the only thing that counts. 
This means that the generic principle of 
justice (premise 10) provides for the 
equal treatment of all human persons. In 
addition, well-being is crucially impor-
tant to both the good of the persons and 
to their individual flourishing (premise 
9). We have seen that the generic princi-
ple of justice includes the principle of 
propriety, which assumes that persons 
are due the advancement of their 
well-being. Since only the equal moral 
status of persons is to be taken into ac-
count, the generic principle of justice 
requires the equal treatment of all per-
sons, which means that justice requires 
that the well-being of all persons should 
be advanced equally. So the principle of 
equality, as a fundamental requirement 

























From Social Justice to Democracy
This section addresses two issues. 
The first is how social justice grounds 
democracy. We have seen that justice 
requires the principle of equality, i.e., 
that the well-being of every person is 
advanced equally. The second issue is 
how to arrive from the abstract principle 
of equality to public equality and the 
public realization of equality. In other 
words, I will examine the transition 
from the abstract principle of justice to 
the public realization of equality in deci-
sion-making procedures. If it can be 
demonstrated that the principle of equal-
ity is realized in democratic institutions, 
then it would mean that the democratic 
procedures themselves are intrinsically 
just. Are democratic institutions justi-
fied because of their intrinsic fairness? 
Once we answer this question, it is pos-
sible to answer the question of what 
constitutes the basis and the limits of 
democratic authority. Christiano argues 
that the answer to all these questions is 
grounded in the principle of public 
equality.
Before discussing the principle of 
public equality, we should first see what 
Christiano means by social justice. His 
definition of social justice is as follows: 
“By ‘social justice’ I mean the justice of 
institutions and interactions among per-
sons. Social justice is the attempt to real-
ize the highly impersonal and abstract 
conception of justice as equality in the 
institutions and interactions among per-
sons” (Christiano, 2008: 47). In contrast 
to the theorists who apply the require-
ments of justice exclusively to institu-
tions and the fundamental structure of 
society, Christiano holds that they should 
equally apply to interpersonal relations. 
In this section I raise an objection to 
Christiano’s view that public equality 
can be equally applied in both cases. To 
be more precise, I will argue that in in-
terpersonal relations, justice can be real-
ized despite the violation of the principle 
of public equality. It is noteworthy that I 
will not question the functioning of the 
principle of public equality in the insti-
tutional context. Another remark before 
we proceed to the principle of public 
equality. Since Christiano interchangea-
bly uses the terms well-being and inter-
est, in this section I will refer to the ab-
stract principle of equality in the form 
that is commonly used in contemporary 
democratic theory – the equal advance-
ment of each person’s interests.
The main characteristic of public 
equality is that it is not enough that jus-
tice is done, it must be seen to be done.2 
Christiano maintains that public equali-
ty is a weak public principle (Christiano, 
2008: 47). In other words, it is not neces-
sary that each person actually realizes 
that they are being treated as equals, but 
that, in principle, they can realize that 
they are being treated as equals. In addi-
tion, it should be noted that public 
equality does not require that all persons 
publicly accept the same conception of 
justice which applies to basic institutions 
as in Rawls’ theory. Christiano suggests 
that it is very likely that due to back-
ground conditions that are typical of 
democracy (which will be discussed in a 
moment) disagreement on various prin-
ciples and conceptions of justice can be 
expected. However, each person can 
recognize that in order to equally ad-
vance her interests, a public deci-
sion-making procedure is needed that 
treats all persons as equals. Despite their 
mutual disagreement on the conceptions 
2 For Christiano’s use of this maxim in the 
context of public equality, see Christiano, 








































of justice and its grounding principles, 
any person can recognize the necessity 
of the principle of public equality. There-
fore, public equality is necessary for so-
cial justice. In the previous section we 
saw that the basic requirement of justice 
is that the interests of all persons are 
equally advanced. The principle of pub-
lic equality suggests that social justice 
requires that this be done in a public 
way.
Christiano gives the following exam-
ple to illustrate the workings of the prin-
ciple of public equality (Christiano, 
2008: 49). Imagine a situation where a 
person owing money to another person 
pays this amount directly to the bank 
account of the creditor on the agreed 
day, without informing the creditor 
about it. Say that, due to the numerous 
financial transactions the creditor had 
that day, he was not able to see that the 
debt had been paid. The creditor calls 
the person who owes the money by tele-
phone to discuss the settlement, but the 
debtor says that the debt had already 
been settled. Now imagine an alternative 
scenario that on the agreed day they 
meet in person and money is handed 
over directly. Christiano believes that 
this example does not question whether 
justice was done in the first case. Howev-
er, the first case points to a deficiency in 
the execution of justice. Although justice 
was done, there is a certain deficiency in 
terms of justice because it was not done 
in a public and obvious way as in the 
second case. Let us consider another ex-
ample that illustrates the importance of 
the principle of publicity for justice. Let 
us imagine that a verdict is delivered to a 
person for an offense that the person 
had committed, but under the circum-
stances cannot recall. And also that their 
sentence was passed in a trial which pro-
ceeded in secret, in the absence of that 
person, which means that the accused 
did not have access to the evidence em-
ployed to pass the verdict. Although this 
is an imaginary scenario, it sufficiently 
indicates that the principle of publicity is 
of critical importance for criminal jus-
tice. Just as it was in the first example, 
despite the fact that justice was done, it 
had not been effected in an obvious way, 
which also points to a deficiency in re-
gards to justice. That is precisely why the 
principle of public equality is important 
for social justice. The principle of public 
equality is required so that each person 
can clearly see that she is treated fairly. 
Although both examples illustrate the 
importance of public equality, that it is 
not enough that justice is done, but it 
must also be seen to be done, they differ 
in that the first relates to the justice in 
interpersonal relations and the other to 
justice in the workings of institutions. 
We have seen that Christiano holds that 
social justice with its requirement of 
equal treatment applies both to institu-
tions and to interpersonal relations. This 
means that the principle of public equal-
ity which is necessary for social justice 
equally applies to both cases.
The main argument for public equal-
ity is grounded in what Christiano calls 
the background facts about judgment 
and on the fundamental interests of per-
sons. Let us first consider the back-
ground facts about judgment. Chris-
tiano argues that in any complex society 
operating on a democratic basis, four 
facts relating to individual judgment can 
be seen. These are the facts of diversity, 
disagreement, infallibility and cognitive 
bias (Christiano, 2008: 4, 56). Since these 
judgments may relate to very different 
things, I will focus only on those that 
relate to interests for the sake of simplic-
ity. Different people tend to have differ-
























judgments would be geared by such 
conceptions of justice which guarantee 
the protection of their interests. In an 
effort to protect their own interests, peo-
ple may be in disagreement as to which 
conception of justice is the most appro-
priate for their society. In addition, it is 
easily imaginable that a person can have 
mistaken judgments about the interests 
of other people whom they do not know 
and who are distant to them, but they 
can also have mistaken judgments in re-
gards to their own interests. And finally, 
another fact about human beings is that 
they are biased in favor of their own in-
terests. As a result, in the formulation of 
a conception of the common good, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, a 
personal conception of good may be fa-
vored.
Having in mind these four back-
ground facts about judgment, Chris-
tiano thinks that people have three fun-
damental interests that should be pro-
tected (Christiano, 2008: 4, 56). Although 
Christiano does not explicitly say so, we 
could add here that the main point of 
this part of the argument is that there are 
actually two kinds of interests, the fun-
damental and the everyday interests, 
and also that fundamental interests have 
priority over everyday interests. In other 
words, despite the fact that their every-
day interests may be different, and often 
conflicting, all people have certain com-
mon fundamental interests that they want 
to protect. Christiano lists three types of 
such fundamental interests. First, each 
person has a fundamental interest in the 
correcting cognitive biases of others. 
Protection of this fundamental interest 
implies that no judgment can be simply 
imposed on other people, because it is 
very likely that it would not reflect the 
conception of justice that they embrace, 
and could thus ignore their interests. 
Each person must therefore be able to 
present their own judgment on what is 
in their best interest, and thus be able to 
correct any erroneous judgment on the 
part of others. Also, if the person is una-
ble to stand up for themselves it is likely 
that their interests will simply be over-
looked. Second, every person has a fun-
damental interest in being at home in 
the world. In other words, it is difficult to 
say that a person would be able to enjoy 
any well-being, if she does not see the 
sense in her environment and is unable 
to achieve her own well-being and life 
plans. Third, every person has a funda-
mental interest to be treated in accord-
ance with the same moral status. If a 
person is denied the opportunity to ex-
press their point of view, then it means 
that this person is not treated as having 
equal moral status, which represents a 
significant loss in terms of their dignity 
and self-respect.
All three fundamental interests point 
to the necessity of the principle of public 
equality in order for persons to be treat-
ed in accordance with the requirement 
of justice which says that the interest of 
every person must be advanced equally. 
Christiano makes this point by saying 
that, “if the facts of cognitive bias, 
at-homeness, and standing are taken 
into account by citizens, it should be 
clear that those adult persons who are 
denied the right of being able to see that 
they are being treated as equals are hav-
ing their interests set back for the sake of 
the interests of the dominant group. 
They are being treated as inferiors and 
being told that their interests are not 
worthy of equal or perhaps any consid-
eration of justice. This is a disastrous loss 
of moral standing. Since there is a deep 
interest in having one’s moral standing 
among one’s fellows clearly recognized 
and affirmed, such a denial of the right 
to publicity must be a serious setback of 








































So the main argument for the princi-
ple of public equality is based on the 
principle of justice which requires the 
equal advancement of the interests of 
each person, the background facts about 
judgment and the fundamental interests 
of persons. If we start from the back-
ground facts about judgment, which 
point to diversity, disagreement, fallibil-
ity and cognitive bias, we can see the 
principle of advancing the interests of 
each person equally in its full signifi-
cance (here the principle applies to what 
I called everyday interests). If social jus-
tice was not based on this principle, it 
would mean that a certain conception of 
the good could be simply imposed on 
other people, by overlooking their inter-
ests, despite their disagreement, and de-
spite the fact that the conception of the 
good could be based on erroneous and 
biased judgments. But as we have seen, 
this abstract requirement of equality is 
not sufficient. Therefore, the fundamen-
tal interests of correcting cognitive bias, 
the interest of at-homeness, and of hav-
ing equal moral status, require that the 
(everyday) interests of all people are ad-
vanced equally in a public way. Each 
person must be able to see that her judg-
ment is taken into consideration in the 
process of decision-making, that she is 
not excluded from the society in which 
she lives and that she is not denied any 
right which would prevent this kind of 
political participation. Therefore, social 
justice requires that every point of view 
must be equally taken into account, and 
that all people should see that this is so. 
This is why the principle of public equal-
ity is necessary for social justice. Chris-
tiano points out that, “when we try to 
implement equality in our social rela-
tions and institutions, we must imple-
ment public equality” (Christiano, 2008: 
73).
However, this conclusion may be 
questioned, at least when it is related to 
an interpersonal case. To see why this is 
so, I will invoke an example formulated 
by de Lazari-Radek and Singer in order 
to defend their consequentialist concep-
tion of “esoteric morality” (de Lazari- 
Radek and Singer, 2010: 37-38) My in-
tention in invoking this example is not 
to defend consequentialism, or “esoteric 
morality,” but only to point out why im-
plementing public equality is not neces-
sary for implementing equality in inter-
personal relations. Let us imagine that a 
person believes that equality is best real-
ized if each person set aside a part of 
their income, that is not necessary to 
satisfy their basic needs, and donated it 
to Oxfam or a similar organization in 
order to help the extremely poor people 
in underdeveloped countries. However, 
having given it more thought, the person 
realizes that such a request could be 
counterproductive and distance people 
from advancing justice. Therefore, the 
same person may decide that a more 
reasonable request would be to publicly 
encourage people to set aside a smaller 
portion of their income, say 10%, to help 
the extremely poor, even if that person 
had acted in accordance with what she 
thinks is the best, and had set aside a 
significantly larger amount. That person 
could also continue to publicly advocate 
10%, while in her private relations with 
persons who share similar beliefs, she 
could defend the best conception, which 
involves donating much more of their 
income. This example shows that the 
advancement of equality can be achieved 
even by violating the principles of public 
equality in interpersonal relations, but 
that would mean that the principle of 
public equality, at least in interpersonal 
relations, is not necessary for social jus-
























social justice applies equally in both cas-
es, encounters the following dilemma: 
either we should reject the view that the 
principle of public equality applies both 
to institutions and interpersonal rela-
tions, or we should offer another argu-
ment which shows that the principle of 
public equality is necessary in interper-
sonal relations.
However, this criticism applies only 
to the interpersonal case, while the real-
ization of the principle of public equality 
in public institutions is left untouched. 
Now I will explain how this principle is 
applied to democratic institutions. So 
far, the argument has established how 
the principle of public equality is derived 
from the abstract principle of equality as 
the requirement of justice. The example 
citing the trial held in secret illustrates 
the importance of publicity in deci-
sion-making procedures in the institu-
tional context, and why it is important 
that each person can see that they are 
being treated fairly. Given that demo-
cratic decision-making procedures take 
into account the interests of each person 
equally and given the publicity of the 
democratic process, we see how democ-
racy is grounded in social justice.3 The 
principle of public equality grounds 
democratic decision-making. For that 
reason, Christiano says that democracy 
can be seen as the public realization of 
equality (Christiano, 2008: 71). For the 
same reason, we can say that democratic 
decision-making procedures are intrin-
sically just to the extent that equality is 
3 Someone might have noticed that, given the 
secret ballot, democratic elections are a mix-
ture of publicity and secrecy. For that rea-
son, we consider it important to take into 
account Elster’s point that “the very publici-
ty of the voting process makes the secret 
vote possible” (Elster, 2013: 8).
realized in a public way.4 This, however, 
does not mean that to answer the ques-
tion about the authority of democracy 
and the limits of that authority, it would 
be enough to take into account only the 
intrinsic fairness of democratic deci-
sion-making procedures (it is necessary, 
for example, to take into account certain 
liberal rights and freedoms). But the es-
tablishment of an intrinsic fairness of 
decision-making procedures is an im-
portant step along the way. Social justice 
requires that all points of view are equal-
ly taken into account in accordance with 
the principle of public equality, and by 
realizing that requirement, democracy 
realizes equality in a public way. That is 
how social justice grounds democracy.
Democracy and Public Equality
Christiano’s justification of democ-
racy relies on the contractualist device of 
hypothetical consent. When deciding on 
what justice requires of them and how 
the fundamental institutions of society 
should be set up, persons should take 
what Christiano calls the egalitarian 
standpoint. The main features of the 
egalitarian standpoint are the following: 
each person’s interests are taken equally 
into account, we should realize what 
equality demands, and we should do so 
by taking into account the facts of judg-
ment and fundamental interests of indi-
viduals (Christiano, 2008: 69–70). 
Christiano thinks that, from this stand-
point, all persons can see that equality 
requires the principle of public equality, 
and that the only justified institutions 
are those that publicly realize equality. 
Since the democratic decision-making 
4 For Christiano’s views on the intrinsic fair-
ness and the intrinsic value of democratic 
procedures, see Christiano, 2008: 3, 71, 75, 








































procedure can be seen as a public reali-
zation of equality, it follows that democ-
racy is justified from the egalitarian 
standpoint. Still, Christiano’s justifica-
tion of democracy from the egalitarian 
standpoint is twofold. On the one hand, 
democracy can be justified instrumen-
tally, as a sort of standard or an end state, 
which the institutions should seek to 
advance. Christiano maintains that, in 
addition to democracy, we can achieve 
agreement in the egalitarian standpoint 
on some basic liberal rights and an eco-
nomic minimum. On the other hand, 
democracy can be justified intrinsically, 
because all persons would be able to see, 
from the egalitarian standpoint, that if 
justice requires taking into account the 
interests of all people equally, the best 
they can do when the facts of judgment 
and fundamental interests are acknowl-
edged is consent to those institutions 
which advance the interests of all per-
sons equally in a public way. Given that 
the realization of public equality is the 
main characteristic of democratic insti-
tutions, they are intrinsically justified 
from the egalitarian standpoint. We can 
now move on to Christiano’s main argu-
ment for democracy.
Here is Christiano’s basic argument 
for democracy in its developed form: 
“The idea is that we share a common 
world in which we wish to establish jus-
tice and advance the common good. 
Since we have roughly equal stakes in 
this common world justice demands 
that our interests be advanced equally 
within it. And social justice demands 
that we realize equality in accordance 
with a publicly clear measure so that jus-
tice may be seen to be done. But we must 
do this in the context of pervasive disa-
greement among persons over how to 
establish justice and the common good 
and the facts of diversity, cognitive bias, 
and fallibility of persons. And each has 
fundamental interests in advancing his 
or her judgment in this context. When 
these facts and interests are acknowl-
edged we see that the only way to ad-
vance the interests of persons equally in 
a way that each can plausibly see to be 
treating him or her as an equal is to give 
each an equal say (within a limited 
scope) over how the common world is to 
be shaped. So democracy is a realization 
of public equality in collective decision- 
making” (Christiano, 2008: 95).
I will explain this complex argument 
for democracy in two steps. The first step 
assumes that persons share what Chris-
tiano calls the common world. The main 
feature of the common world is the in-
terdependence of fundamental interests 
of all persons inhabiting it. Christiano 
views the common world largely as the 
interdependence of the fundamental in-
terests within a state. The state forms the 
backbone of the rule of law and of pro-
viding public goods such as a environ-
mental protection, a common system of 
education, etc. This does not mean that 
the processes unfolding globally do not 
affect the fundamental interests of per-
sons, but Christiano thinks that they are 
not interdependent at the global level in 
the same way they are within a state. It is 
only in such a common world that inter-
dependence implies that everyone’s in-
terests have equal stake. Since everyone 
has the equal stake in the common 
world, we see why justice requires that 
the interest of each person must be 
equally advanced. However, taking into 
account the facts of judgment, disagree-
ments on the interpretation of this re-
quirement of justice can be expected. On 
the one hand, we have the requirement 
that the common world should be ar-
ranged according to justice, while on the 
























conception of justice is best suited for 
the common world. Given that the com-
mon world is a non-divisible good, from 
the egalitarian standpoint we can realize 
that the resources for collective deci-
sion-making on how to shape a common 
world can be distributed equally. So the 
principle of public equality, adopted 
from the egalitarian standpoint, requires 
the equal right to vote and equal oppor-
tunity to participate in public delibera-
tion. Christiano also adds to this the 
equal right to be elected, and the some-
what controversial requirement of the 
equal distribution of resources for bar-
gaining (Christiano, 2008: 85, 95).
The second step contains the argu-
ment for the intrinsic fairness of democ-
racy that was discussed in the previous 
section. It is now further elaborated by 
invoking the egalitarian standpoint and 
some of the basic features of democratic 
procedures. From the egalitarian stand-
point, a person can see that, taking into 
account the facts about judgment, which 
include diversity, disagreement, fallibili-
ty and cognitive bias, public equality is 
necessary for the advancement of the 
interests of all persons equally. From the 
same perspective, we can see that the 
fundamental interests of persons (that 
cognitive biases must be corrected, 
at-homeness and to have the same moral 
status) are disturbed if the procedures of 
political decision-making deprives a 
person or a group of persons of the pos-
sibility of equal participation. Given that 
fundamental interests would have to be 
protected and that the egalitarian stand-
point requires the principle of public 
equality, which could be realized by the 
equal distribution of votes and of the 
opportunities for deliberation, it follows 
from the egalitarian standpoint that it is 
justified for each person to have an equal 
say in the process of collective deci-
sion-making. Therefore, democracy is 
the public realization of equality. Thus 
we arrive at the conclusion of Chris-
tiano’s main argument for democracy.
In addition, Christiano says that de-
mocracy is a unique public realization of 
equality. The problem is that there is an 
ambiguity concerning this claim. Ac-
cording to one interpretation, the proce-
dure of democratic decision-making is a 
unique realization of public equality be-
cause it is different from the other types 
of political decision-making.5 Accord-
ing to another interpretation, democra-
cy as the unique realization of public 
equality means that only democracy is 
instrumental to realizing the principle of 
justice, which requires that the interests 
of each person be advanced equally. The 
latter interpretation is implied in Chris-
tiano’s claim, “that the equality involved 
in democratic decision-making is the 
uniquely public realization of the equal 
advancement of interests when the 
background facts of judgment and the 
interests in judgment are taken into ac-
count” (Christiano, 2008: 78). I think 
that the bulk of evidence indicates that 
the first interpretation of the uniqueness 
thesis is correct. However, there is evi-
dence that suggests a different interpre-
tation. And if the latter interpretation of 
the uniqueness thesis is correct, it could 
be opposed with a whole range of coun-
terexamples.
It seems to me that some of Chris-
tiano’s critics understand his uniqueness 
thesis according to the second interpre-
tation. Thus Estlund says as follows: “It is 
not clear to me that a proposal of extra 
votes for the educated couldn’t be made 
in a way that reflects and conveys equal 
5 For Christiano’s claims that support this in-









































regard for everyone’s interests. The pro-
posal is to empower the people who 
would be best suited to ascertain which 
laws and policies would treat people’s 
interests equally. The suspicion that this 
is unlikely to succeed is different from 
the charge, upon which Christiano’s ob-
jection to the arrangement would seem 
to depend, that it is biased against cer-
tain people’s interests” (Estlund, 2009: 
245). Arneson argues in a similar vein: 
“In the argument from publicity to the 
claim that democracy is intrinsically 
just, the fact that society is democratic 
evidently conveys a message to members 
of society. Democratic governance pro-
cedures are used to signal the commit-
ment of society to the principle of equal 
consideration. But messages can be 
communicated in various ways. Why 
suppose that the only effective way to 
convey a commitment to justice is 
through instituting and maintaining de-
mocracy? If autocracy is chosen on the 
ground that it leads to morally superior 
results, and this surmise is correct, then 
over time autocracy will produce justice, 
or at least more justice than would be 
obtainable under any other type of polit-
ical regime. What could manifest a com-
mitment to doing justice more obviously 
and credibly than actually doing justice 
over time? We are not talking here about 
private acts performed in people’s bed-
rooms, we are talking about the public 
policies pursued by a government and 
the changes over time in its institutions, 
social norms and practices” (Arneson, 
2004: 57). The gist of these arguments is 
certainly not to defend the conception of 
plural voting, or any kind of autocratic 
regime, but to formulate counterexam-
ples for Christiano’s thesis that democra-
cy is the unique way for the public reali-
zation of equality. Evidently, both au-
thors understand this thesis according 
to the second interpretation because 
they view the principle of justice as re-
quiring an equal consideration of inter-
ests as independent from democratic 
decision-making procedures. I think 
that, if the second interpretation is cor-
rect, it is possible to construe an even 
stronger counterargument on the 
grounds of the above criticisms. It is 
possible to imagine a series of similar 
examples, which suggests that public 
equality is multiply realized. If that is so, 
then it is possible to formulate a wild 
disjunction of different realizations of 
public equality. And this wild disjunc-
tion undermines the thesis of the unique 
realization of public equality. This argu-
ment holds only if we assume that the 
second interpretation is correct. But as I 
already stressed, I maintain a reserva-
tion as to the correct interpretation of 
the uniqueness thesis.
Conclusion
This article dealt with the part of 
Christiano’s democratic theory that points 
to the fundamental importance of the 
principle of public equality for the justi-
fication of democracy. I have demon-
strated how the principle of equality is 
derived from the conception of the dig-
nity of persons, and how the principle of 
public equality is derived from the prin-
ciple of equality. I explained why Chris-
tiano thinks public equality is a require-
ment of social justice. I also accentuated 
his view that this requirement of social 
justice applies equally to institutions and 
to interpersonal relations. Accordingly, I 
pointed out the problem of applying the 
principle of public equality in an inter-
personal case. This paper also discussed 
Christiano’s grounding of democracy in 
the principle of public equality. In that 
























Christiano’s main argument which shows 
that democracy is the public realization 
of equality. I also examined his addition-
al thesis that democracy is a unique real-
ization of public equality, and expressed 
some doubts concerning this thesis.
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Javna jednakost, demokracija i pravednost
SAŽETAK Ovaj članak propituje načelo javne jednakosti koje je, prema poziciji koju brani 
Thomas Christiano u svojoj knjizi The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its 
Limits, od središnje važnosti za društvenu pravednost i demokraciju. Christiano također 
smatra da je autoritet demokracije, kao i njegove granice, utemeljen u tom načelu. Chri-
stianova demokratska teorija može se, općenito govoreći, podijeliti u dva dijela. Prvi dio 
bavi se izvodom i opravdanjem načela javne jednakosti. Drugi dio pojašnjava zašto i na 
koji način su autoritet demokracije i određivanje njegovih granice utemeljeni na tom na-
čelu. Ovaj se članak bavi samo s prvim dijelom Christianove teorije. Iako je i drugi dio va-
žan za Christianovu demokratsku teoriju, prije nego propitamo ulogu koju igra načelo 
javne jednakosti, bitno je propitati njegovu prirodu. Stoga, ovaj se članak primarno bavi s 
prirodom načela javne jednakosti kao preduvjeta socijalne pravednosti i temelja oprav-
danja demokracije.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI javna jednakost, pravednost, demokracija, institucije, interpersonalni 
 odnosi
